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Abstract 
We quantified influences of Confucianism on gender inequality in present-day Vietnam. We 
used the number (or density) of the most successful test takers in the Vietnamese imperial 
examinations (1075–1919) in a given district as a proxy for mastering the subject of 
Confucianism. Using an instrumental variable approach, we considered possible impacts on 
sex ratio and educational attainment of women relative to men, based on test score and 
population census data. We found that Confucianism has a long lasting impact on gender 
inequality. The results also suggested that women tended to try harder, perhaps as a 
countermeasure against discrimination.  
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1. Introduction 
Confucianism has played an important role, stretching back millennia, in the history of 
many Asian states, particularly in ancient China and its sphere of influence, which included 
Korea and Vietnam. For centuries, questions about Confucian ideology were included on 
examinations for selecting public officials to serve in the imperial courts of China and Vietnam.  
The doctrines of Confucianism had the effect of relegating women to an inferior social 
status, making them dependent on male family members throughout their life1. Women were 
prohibited from taking the imperial examinations (Rosenlee, 2006, page 129) in China and 
Vietnam, and thus literary learning (“文” in Chinese) became an aspect of male privilege. In 
addition, Confucianism established a norm of gendered division of labor: men worked outside 
the home (“外” in Chinese, meaning “exterior”) and women worked inside the home (“内” in 
Chinese, meaning “interior”) (Rosenlee, 2006, page 82 and 127). It has been suggested that the 
oppression of women may have resulted from a combination of filiality, patrilineality, and 
ancestor worship (Rosenlee, 2006, page 123)2  because filial devotion is to one’s father’s 
lineage. In this context, women and girls would be less favored compared with their male 
counterparts, especially in education, thereby resulting in lower female literacy rates. 
The formal institutions in these states influenced by Confucianism have followed 
fluctuating trends regarding gender equality. First, Confucianism did not remain central to the 
institutions of these states. For example, both China and Vietnam had terminated their imperial 
examinations by 1919 and would later become Communist nations, in which the role of women 
was elevated, at least figuratively, when Mao Zedong proclaimed that “women hold up half of 
the sky.” Laws enacted by communist institutions helped raise the status of women in society. 
 
1  The Four Books and Five Classics comprise the main canonical text of Confucianism, which 
prescribes three obediences and four virtues for women as filial piety. The three obediences, which 
originated from one of the Five Classics, instruct women to obey their father during childhood, their 
husband when married, and their sons when widowed, in order to maintain the social order. The four 
virtues impose rigid standards on women, namely, diligent work, modest manner, proper speech, and 
moral behavior. 
2 According to Rosenlee (2006, page 122), the practice of female infanticide dates back to at least the 
late Qin and early Han Dynasties (when Vietnam was dominated by Chinese Dynasties). Similarly, 
concubinage with the aim of producing a male heir was a common, legally recognized practice during 
the Han Dynasty (page 123). 
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For example, the Marriage and Family Law of 1959 in Vietnam protected women from 
concubinage and forced (in other word, child) marriage (Goodkind, 1995). Second, the impact 
of communism is also pronounced (Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln, 2007). The literature shows 
evidence of the positive impact of communism on gender equality, including a higher labor 
force participation rate, a lower gender wage gap (Meng and Kidd, 1997), and almost no gender 
gap in literacy rate (Goodkind, 1995). Women growing up during the communist era would 
have had a greater incentive to compete (Booth et al., 2018).  
Whereas the formal institutions in former Confucian states have changed considerably, 
many informal institutions remain today in the form of cultural norms (Alesina and Giuliano, 
2015). Various studies (including Das Gupta et al., 2003) have suggested the influence of 
Confucianism as one of the causes of son preference, which has resulted in skewed sex ratios 
in present-day China, Korea, and Vietnam; however, these studies did not conduct direct 
quantitative estimations of the causal effect of Confucianism on sex ratio. Consequently, the 
impact of Confucianism on educational attainment remains to be elucidated. 
In this paper, the relationship between Confucianism and gender inequality in Vietnam 
is examined. Vietnam is of interest for several reasons. First, Confucianism experienced more 
disruptions in Vietnam than anywhere else. For example, Chinese characters are no longer used 
in Vietnam and this could have impacted the written transmission of Confucianism. In addition, 
periods of Vietnamese history, such as French colonial rule and the division of the country into 
North and South Vietnam, likely fueled the shift away from Confucianism. The Vietnam War 
and other military conflicts led to excess mortality in the male population (Goodkind, 1995), 
which might have increased women’s social bargaining power. Later, when the Sino-
Vietnamese diplomatic relationship deteriorated in 1979, many ethnic Chinese fled Vietnam 
(Nguyen and Imai, 2017), which may have further distanced the country from Confucian 
influences.  
Second, recent studies have shown mixed evidence of improvements in gender equality 
during the economic transition in Vietnam. On the positive side, rather than a continuous rise 
in inequality after the transition, Vu and Yamada (2018) showed that the gender wage gap 
declined from 2002 to 2014 because of increases in educational attainment and specific paid 
work participation by women. Similarly, the Global Gender Gap Report 2020 by the World 
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Economic Forum3 ranked Vietnam 31st in economic participation and opportunity and 93rd in 
educational attainment4 out of 153 selected countries. Vu (2014a) suggested that Vietnamese 
parents would be as concerned about their daughters’ education as much as their sons’ when 
assigning housework. The entry of various religions that were not well known to Vietnamese 
before the 17th century might also have had an impact on the sex ratio in Vietnam (Vu and 
Yamada, 2020b). On the negative side, the abovementioned report by the World Economic 
Forum ranked Vietnam 110th in political empowerment and 151st in health and survival, both 
of which are in the bottom one-third of the list. Son preference continues to be prevalent in 
Vietnam (Vu, 2014b) and the skewness of the sex ratio has been accelerating since 2005 
(Guilmoto, 2012). Vietnamese men continue to neglect housework even when they have lower 
educational attainment and lower income compared with their wives (Vu, 2019b).  
Third, Vu and Yamada (2020a) showed a persistent effect of Vietnamese imperial 
examinations on the contemporary quantity and quality of education in Vietnam. However, 
that study did not examine the relative educational attainment between men and women. 
Whether improvements in overall educational attainment are due to advancement among men 
or come at the expense of women remains to be clarified.  
Therefore, the present study investigates the impact of Confucianism on gender 
inequality in present-day Vietnam in terms of the core values of Confucianism toward women 
and girls. Specifically, we consider two main factors, namely, female survival (sex ratio 
between females and males under 5 years of age) and relative educational attainment of women 
compared with men.  
To construct a proxy for the influence of Confucianism in Vietnam, we use the number 
(or density) of successful test takers who passed the imperial examinations at the national level 
during 1075–1919 (hereinafter, Confucian elites) per district (or the district’s area in square 
kilometers when density is used). This proxy is appropriate for several reasons. First, the 
content of the examinations was mainly about Confucianism. Therefore, successful examinees 
were very likely the most knowledgeable people about Confucianism in the country at the time. 
Second, Confucianism is considered to have informed many cultural norms, and cultural norms 
are known to be transferred via kinship, schooling, and social interaction (Becker et al., 2016). 
 
3 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf. The lower the number, the larger the gender 
gap. 
4 The difference in rank between Vietnam and nearby advanced economies was not large. Singapore 
was ranked 84th and Japan was 91st, while China and South Korea were 100th and 101st, respectively.  
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Passing the national-level examinations required years of study, which in turn required proper 
investment in education from one’s village of residence. Nguyen (2005) found old regulations 
that prescribed how village institutions were to facilitate Confucian education as well as the 
existence of common rice fields that were dedicated to sponsoring local (village) Confucian 
schools in ancient Vietnam.  
We conducted analyses at the district and individual levels, using an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach. We examined whether the number (or density) of Confucian elites was 
associated with relative outcomes between men and women. We used the average distance 
from each district to the test venues (taking into account both changes in test venue location 
and territorial expansion to the South over time) as an IV because the distance would reflect 
the cost of learning. If the impact of Confucianism is minimal, we expect the estimated 
coefficients of interest to be statistically insignificant in explaining the outcomes. 
We constructed two corresponding data sets by combining the list of Confucian elites 
with either the 2009 Population and Housing Census or the 2009 National Entrance 
Examinations to University (NEEU), matching data by district. We selected different outcomes 
at the district and individual levels. In the district-level data set, we calculated the following: 
sex ratio (boys/girls) among the population aged 0–4 years; literacy rate among the population 
aged 11–33; years of schooling among the population aged 22 years or older; school 
attendance, dropout rate, and non-enrollment among 11–14 and 15–17 age cohorts; and the 
participation rate in the NEEU among those born in 1991. Educational attainment ratios were 
specified for each gender and a corresponding relative ratio (in other words, that of men divided 
by that of women) was also included. Similarly, at the individual level, we used standardized 
test scores for the three academic subjects used in each of four NEEU classifications according 
to age and gender. We found a long lasting impact of Confucianism on gender inequality in 
Vietnam for all the above outcomes despite substantial changes in Vietnamese society and 
formal institutions. However, the results also suggest diminishing impacts with successive 
generations and responses by women to discrimination.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it quantifies the influence 
of Confucianism on various outcomes in terms of the core norms of Confucianism regarding 
gender. Second, it provides a novel proxy for the influence of Confucianism in quantitative 
analysis. Specifically, this proxy captures the quality of mastering knowledge about 
Confucianism. Third, the results of the study demonstrate that the impact of Confucianism 
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survives via informal institutions, specifically kinship and social interaction, despite the lack 
of formal training (schools) and written language in the form of Chinese characters.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
Section 3 outlines our methods and econometric specifications. Section 4 reports the main 
results. Section 5 presents the conclusion and discusses some remaining issues. 
2. Data 
We combined a list of Confucian elites with either the 2009 Population and Housing 
Census or the 2009 NEEU, matching data by district to create one data set at the district level 
and another at the individual level (see Online Appendices 3–5 for descriptive statistics of each 
data set). Each data set is described in more detail below. 
First, we used the list of Confucian elites compiled by Ngo (2006), which includes 
names, exam years, and hometowns that were recorded on stelae stored in Temples of 
Confucius in Hanoi and Hue, as well as in imperial documents stored in village common-
houses in other regions. Ngo (2006) recorded the present-day districts of the Confucian elite’s 
hometowns based on the old geographical locations. We counted the total number of Confucian 
elites between 1075 and 1919 in each district from the list. 
Second, we used the 2009 Population and Housing Census conducted on April 1, 2009 
by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. The census captured 100 percent of the Vietnamese 
population (86.89 million) and focused on population structure and educational attainment. We 
aggregated various outcomes at the district level5. We combined the list of Confucian elites 
with these aggregated outcomes using the same district identity to create a district-level data 
set. We additionally used a 3 percent sample from the 1999 Population and Housing Census 
(conducted on April 1, 1999) for additional outcomes and robustness checks. 
Third, we constructed the standardized test scores (z-score) of test takers born in 1991 
for each of four test classifications (A, B, C, and D) from the 2009 NEEU and matched them 
with the list of Confucian elites according to the family-registration district of the NEEU test 
takers to create an individual-level data set. Also, we calculated the total number of NEEU test 
takers per district and added this information to the district-level data set6. This cohort of NEEU 
 
5 See the section “Specification”. 
6 About 44 percent of 2009 high school graduates took the 2009 NEEU. 
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test takers was expected to have graduated high school in May 2009. Furthermore, in 2009, 
test takers born in 1991 would have no repeated grade levels within 12 years of education. This 
cohort comprised about 87 percent of all registered test takers.  
The NEEU is administered by the Vietnamese Ministry of Education and Training 
(MoET). MoET chose the test exams dates, academic subjects, and classifications in March 
2009. All test takers had to register with MoET by May 2009 to take the NEEU, which 
determines university placement. During the registration process, applicants had to fill in the 
hometown district listed in their family register7. 
The 2009 NEEU had 11 classifications, identified by letters of the alphabet; 98 percent 
of test takers sat for classifications A, B, C, and D (for a detailed description of the 2009 NEEU, 
see Vu, 2019a and/or Vu and Yamada, 2020a). Each classification comprised three subjects. 
For example, classification A had physics, mathematics, and chemistry tests. The exams for 
classifications A and V were held on July 4–5, 2009 and the rest were held on July 9–10, 2009.  
University placement was based on the total score of the three subjects in each 
classification. A university can use several classifications for placement. However, the 
classifications and their respective quotas were determined and announced in March–April 
2009, before test takers registered with MoET. The test problems for the subjects in each 
classification were the same nationwide, as was the test time. The cut-off score for university 
placement was decided only after all answer sheets had been scored (probably in August 2009). 
Once all the scores were recorded, universities ranked the test scores from highest to lowest 
and counted from the top until the pre-determined quota of students was filled. Therefore, the 
goal of each test taker was to achieve the highest score they could in order to receive the 
placement of their choice. The distribution of test scores did not have a passing hurdle (see Vu, 
2019a) as is sometimes the case to get a high school diploma.  
In addition, we used geographical information from each district as control variables. 
We integrated this information into both the individual- and district-level data sets according 
to district. More specifically, we obtained information on 2009 nighttime light data from the 
US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Version 4 DMSP-OLS Nighttime 
Lights Time Series), the 1992 Global Land Cover Characterization, and the 1996 Landsat 
Imagery from the United States Geological Survey Earth Resources Observation and Science 
Center. We calculated the mean nighttime light intensity, elevation, cropland ratio, and urban 
 
7 According to examination regulations, university preferences cannot be changed. 
 8 
land ratio for each district. We also measured the distance from each district to the coastline 
using shape files (Version 3.6) obtained from the Database of Global Administrative Areas 
(www.gadm.org). 
3. Methods and specifications 
3.1 Methods 
We used a reduced form equation to regress the outcomes of each district ! on the 
number of Confucian elites ("#$!%&!) (and separately, their density, '#$!%&!) located in the 
district in an ordinary least squares estimation followed by an instrumental approach. The 
outcomes cover sex ratio and educational attainment by gender. We used the same methods for 
both sets of data (district- and individual-level). Here, we describe the methods for the district-
level data set only. 
Our target is to estimate (  
(1) )*%+,-&. = (. "#$1%&2 ! + 4. 5! + 6! , 
where 	5! is a vector of the natural conditions and characteristics of the district. However, Vu 
and Yamada (2020a) showed several reasons why the number of Confucian elites would not 
be random. One such reason is that some districts would have had relative advantages in terms 
of educational facilities in the past. Therefore, we need to conduct an instrumental approach in 
which (1) is the second stage.  
Before estimating (1), we implemented the first stage  
(2) "#$!%&! 	= 8. 9:! + ;. 	5! + <! 	, 
where 9:!  is an IV. The fitted value from (2) is used in the second stage of equation (1). 
Specifically, we implemented a two-step feasible general method of moment with robust 
standard errors, with the ratio of district populations to country populations as weights. 
Following Vu and Yamada (2020a), we took advantage of variations in the test venues 
and the expansion of Vietnamese territory (see Online Appendix 1 and 2) to construct the IV 
for the number of Confucian elites. More specifically, we constructed an average distance from 
each district to the corresponding test venues for each examination from 1075–1919. The 
distance serves as a proxy for educational costs. Because Vietnam is long, narrow, and crossed 
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by mountains, the cost of traveling to the test venue would have accounted for a large 
proportion of the total educational expenditure for each test taker. We applied Vu and 
Yamada’s (2020a) suggestion to use the maximum distance (in other words, 2272 km) for those 
districts that were not yet part of Vietnam during the test year. We also substituted this number 
with other values (3000 km and 4000 km) for robustness checks. 
We have some evidence and arguments for the validity of our IV choice. First, the 
average distance was an important part of the total educational expenditure for the test takers. 
The average distance explains well the number of elites (density of elites), as shown in Online 
Appendix 6. Its coefficients were statistically significant regardless of whether the province 
fixed effect was in place. Second, the IV is not related to the present-day density of schools 
and health facilities. Following Vu and Yamada (2020a), we estimated these correlations as 
per Online Appendix 7. When the province fixed effect was in place, the coefficient of this 
distance became statistically insignificant. Therefore, if the IV can influence the education, 
health, and relative gender outcomes, the channel should be through the variable of interest 
("#$!%&/'#$!%&).  
3.2 Specifications 
From the two corresponding data sets, we constructed 11 categories of outcomes for 
the district-level analysis and 16 types of test score outcomes for the individual-level analysis. 
Wherever possible, we generally had three outcomes for each category. We constructed one 
outcome for each gender and a relative one by dividing that of female by that of male. The 
relative outcomes show differences among districts in terms of gender inequality.  
For the general district indicator, we counted the number of boys aged 0–4 years and 
divided by the number of girls in the same age group to determine the .&>	?@%!, for each 
district. Next, we selected a cohort of 11–33-year-olds to count the $!%&?@+A	?@%& for each 
district. This age range was chosen because primary school education is compulsory in 
Vietnam for those aged 6–10 years, so individuals over the age of 11 years can be expected to 
have attended school in the past, and because those born in or after 1976 (the year after Vietnam 
reunited) would be 33 years old or younger in 2009 and would have been subject to the same 
educational policies. In addition, we counted the average years of schooling for each district 
based on its population aged 22 years and older, the majority of whom completed their 
education in 2009.  
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For age cohort-specific district indicators on education, we added three outcomes for 
two age cohorts (11–14 and 15–17) corresponding to middle school and high school. For each 
age cohort, we considered the school attendance rate for each district by dividing the number 
of people confirmed as “attending school” as of April 1, 2009 by the corresponding total 
population of the same age cohort. We performed the same calculation for those who had 
dropped out of school as of April 1, 20098. We also calculated the non-enrollment rate in each 
district for both age cohorts. In addition, we added the school attendance rate and NEEU test-
taking rate for the population of those born in 1991 for each district. Therefore, the denominator 
of the formula used to determine the NEEU test-taking rate included the population of those 
born in 1991 and those attending school. 
Finally, we used seven district characteristics as controls in every estimation, including 
the ratio of the Kinh ethnic group in 2009, population density, nighttime light intensity, 1996 
elevation, 1992 cropland and urban land ratio, and the distance to the coastline. The 
information was taken from the 2009 population census and the abovementioned satellite data. 
We also added a specific variable for individual characteristics, ",	B?!C!$&D&, to the controls 
in individual-level estimations. The opposite status, privilege, was associated with an 
educational policy that granted a fixed number of extra points to individuals whose parents or 
who themselves were veterans and/or national (labor) heroes.  
4. Results 
4.1 Sex ratio and general educational attainment 
We found a impact of Confucianism in the 2009 sex ratio among children under 5 years 
of age in the district. More specifically, the presence of an additional Confucian elite had a 
nexus with 18 “missing” girls (in other words, 18 additional boys) among 10,000 girls in the 
0–4 age cohort in the district, as shown in Column (8) of Table 1. This equals 227 missing girls 
(45 annually) for a typical Vietnamese district in Vietnam with a population of about 126,000 
people. We considered sex selection as a black box and counted only the outcome (the sex 
ratio). The black box contained both prenatal selection (sex-selective abortion) and postnatal 
selection (neglect of daughters). Previous demographic studies have blamed Confucianism 
 
8 Wednesday, April 1, 2009 was in the school calendar. 
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(son preference) for sex-selective abortions without statistical evidence. Our continuous 
variable for the number of Confucian elites would be the best statistical evidence for this 
argument. However, our results do not imply that districts lacking Confucian elites have not 
been influenced by Confucianism as manifested by son preference. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
In addition, the number missing girls is very likely due to prenatal sex selection. This 
is because a lower child mortality rate was associated with a higher number of elites in the 
district, as shown in Online Appendix 15. We performed a similar exercise with a 3 percent 
sample of the 1999 Population and Housing Census and used the average child mortality rate 
per district as the outcome. The rate was calculated from the respondents’ total number of 
children and how many of these children had died9.  
Similarly, we found a impact of Confucianism on gender inequality in two other 
important outcomes related to educational attainment, namely, literacy and years of schooling, 
as shown in columns (11) and (14) of Table 1. The presence of an additional elite was 
associated with a 0.0004 times higher male literacy in the district. Similarly, if both genders 
went to school, an additional elite in the district’s history was associated with 0.0012 additional 
years of male schooling.  
However, the presence of Confucian elites in a district does not always translate into 
negative outcomes for women and girls. We found that the presence of Confucian elites was 
associated with a 0.002 times lower probability of female illiteracy compared with districts 
lacking Confucian elites, as well as an additional 0.1 years of schooling regardless of gender.  
4.2 Educational attainment for specific age cohorts 
We further investigated the timing when girls’ educational attainment diverged from 
boys’ in association with Confucian elites. We chose the 11–14 and 15–17 age cohorts because 
the 6–10 cohort was subject to compulsory education. Higher age was associated with higher 
risk of budget constraints and gender inequality. 
We found that gender inequality is persistently associated with the number of 
Confucian elites in outcomes, including school attendance and non-enrollment rates. In relative 
terms, an additional elite had a nexus with a 0.002 (0.004) times lower school attendance rate 
 
9 No gender was specified in the questionnaires. 
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and a 0.011 (0.015) times higher probability of non-enrollment for age cohort 11–14 (15–17), 
as per Table 3 (Table 4). However, we also noted that gender inequality associated with the 
presence of Confucian elites tended to be lower in the younger age cohort (11–14). 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
However, we also found the opposite effect in the outcome of school dropout rate, as 
shown in column (15) of Tables 2 and 3. The presence of an elite was associated with a 0.003–
0.004 times lower relative school dropout rate for girls compared with boys. 
In addition, we noted that in comparison with their counterparts’ outcomes in other 
districts, both genders in a district that was home to Confucian elites had higher educational 
attainment in association with the number of elites (see columns (9), (10), (12), and (13) of 
Table 1). Thus, the presence of Confucian elites does not always translate into negative 
outcomes for present-day generations, only in the relative comparisons between genders 
residing in the same area. 
We specifically selected individuals born in 1991 to investigate arguably the most 
important test in their life, the 2009 NEEU, which would determine their university placement 
(Table 4). The test divides individuals into two different groups with significant differences in 
years of schooling (4– 5 years or more, with a tertiary degree). For the outcome of school 
attendance rate, the results were similar to those of the 15–17 age cohort. Boys in districts that 
had been home to Confucian elites had the same probability of taking the 2009 NEEU as did 
boys in non-elite districts. In contrast, girls had a 0.004 times higher probability of taking the 
2009 NEEU in association with the presence of an additional elite (columns (10) and (11) in 
Table 4). As a result, the relative female-to-male ratio favors girls by as much as 0.013 times. 
The 2009 NEEU test fee was about USD 2 per test classification and the majority of 
Vietnamese universities in 2009 were public institutions. To understand why girls in elite 
district were more likely to take the NEEU in association with the number of Confucian elites 
in their district, we investigated the 2009 NEEU test scores.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
We found that coefficients of the number of Confucian elites tended to be higher in 
samples of girls compared with those in samples of boys for classifications A, C, and D, as 
shown in Table 5. In particular, differences in coefficients were magnified when female test 
takers were the majority in the classification. The majority of NEEU test takers sat for 
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classifications A, C, and D. Therefore, we speculated that the higher probability of taking the 
NEEU among girls in districts that were home to Confucian elites was likely due to self-
selection. Despite some gender discrimination resulting from district-based norms, girls in 
these districts had better learning outcomes (educational quality) on average than their 
counterparts in non-elite districts. This speculation may also apply to the results on relatively 
lower school dropout rate, as shown in column (15) of Tables 2 and 3.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
4.3 Robustness checks 
First, we replaced the number of elites per district with the density of elites per district 
in square kilometers and repeated all the main estimations. In general, the results of the new 
estimations were consistent with those of the original estimations, as shown in Online 
Appendices 8–12. There were two exceptions corresponding to male educational outcomes, 
namely, the subjects Geography and Foreign Language, as shown in Online Appendix 12. The 
corresponding coefficients were statistically insignificant. In addition, we noted that boys in 
elite districts performed worse in History compared with their counterparts in non-elite 
districts, in association with elites according to either specification ("&$!%&  or '&$!%& ). 
Unfortunately, we did not have sufficient data about the families of the 2009 NEEU test takers 
to adequately explain this specific statistical result. However, our interpretation of the sum of 
scores should be valid regardless of these specific subject-related differences. 
 Second, we repeated the main estimations in Tables 1–5 using different assumptions 
about the maximum distance. Specifically, we replaced 2272 km with 3000 and 4000 km as 
alternatives. The corresponding coefficients of these alternatives were exactly the same as 
those from the main estimations (Online Appendix 13). 
Third, we were aware of spatial correlations (Kelly, 2019) and used a corresponding 
method suggested by Colella et al. (2019). We repeated the estimations for several assumptions 
about distance where spatial correlations may be most pronounced (namely 25, 50, and 100 
km). A typical district with an area of 435 km2 is approximately equal to a circle with a radius 
of 12 km. Therefore, a special correlation setting with 25 km would be a reasonable assumption 
because this is the approximate distance between directly adjacent districts. The results with 
the 25-km assumption (Online Appendix 14) were similar to our main results. 
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5. Conclusions and discussion 
We examined whether there is a persistent effect of Confucianism, proxied by the 
number (or density) of Confucian elites in a district, in gender inequality in present-day 
Vietnam despite enormous changes in formal institutions over many years. We applied the 
average distance from each district to the test venues as an instrumental variable. We found 
that the impact of Confucianism is still lasting in terms of sex ratio, literacy rate, school non-
enrollment rate, and years of schooling. Among the three channels of transmission suggested 
by Becker et al. (2016), kinship and social interaction are the most likely explanations for the 
observed outcomes. Meanwhile, we found an upside for girls, who are likely more determined 
to attain more years of schooling, as evidenced by relatively lower school dropout rates, higher 
likelihood of taking the NEEU, and higher NEEU test scores in association with the number of 
Confucian elites in their district. This is perhaps the result of compensating for gender 
discrimination. In addition, the results suggest that the impact of Confucianism tends to be 
weaker for younger age cohorts. 
We acknowledge several limitations of our study. First, non-elite districts might have 
applied Confucian practices at different levels; however, we considered all non-elite districts 
to be of the same level. Second, the list of Confucian elites used in this study is the largest such 
list presently available, but it is incomplete. Fourth, we could not adequately explain why boys 
underperformed in Geography in association with the number (or density) of elites. These 
limitations will be addressed in a future research scheme when more data and information are 
available for analysis. 
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Online Appendix 1 Imperial examinations in Vietnam, 1075–1919 
Year of exams 
  
Dynasty Test venue Raw data 
  Province District Test times Elites  
1075–1225 Ly  Hanoi Ba Dinh 4 11 
1232–1393 Tran  Hanoi Ba Dinh 16 49 
1400–1405 Ho Thanh Hoa Vinh Loc 3 11 
1426–1526 Le Hanoi Ba Dinh 32 1,008 
1529–1592 Mac Hanoi Ba Dinh 22 482 
1554–1595 Le Thanh Hoa Tho Xuan 8 51 
1598–1787 Le Hanoi Ba Dinh 64 723 
1822–1919 Nguyen Thua Thien Hue Hue 39 553 
Sum       188 2,888 
Source: Ngo (2006).
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Online Appendix 2 Number of elites and approximate territory expansion timelines 
 
Notes:  
The map is from Vu and Yamada (2020a). The timeline for territory expansion is based on Tran 
(1920), used for constructing the instrumental variable only.
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Online Appendix 3 Descriptive statistics of general indicators 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Number of elites (Elite number) 4.1325 11.2106 0 98 
Density of elites (Elite density) 0.0547 0.3444 0 7.7807 
Instrumental variable (km) 999.96 845.57 23 2,127 
District population 126,227 87,751 83 701,194 
District area (km2) 435 403 1.54 2,679 
Urban land rate 0.0228 0.1147 0 1 
Cropland rate 0.4697 0.3165 0 1 
Elevation mean (m) 216 310 1 1,545 
Distance to coastal line (km) 86 85 0.23 435 
Nighttime light intensity 8.39 14.19 0 63 
Sex ratio (< 5 years old) 1.0812 0.0432 0.7143 1.2583 
Literate (11-33 years old)     
   Female (F) 0.9391 0.1026 0.3361 1 
   Male (M) 0.9606 0.0454 0.6382 1 
   Relative (F/M) 0.9748 0.0773 0.4594 1.0345 
Years of schooling (22+)     
    Female (F) 7.1009 2.2856 2.8169 54.5 
    Male (M) 7.4859 1.6114 2.9309 13.7852 
    Relative (F/M) 0.9503 0.1402 0.7703 4.3077 
 
Notes:  
N = 687 districts 
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Online Appendix 4 Descriptive statistics of district data on educational outcomes  
Variable N district Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: 11-14 years old population 
School attendance rate      
   Female (F) 687 0.8863 0.1018 0.3761 1 
   Male (M) 686 0.8775 0.0871 0.5235 0.9876 
   Relative (F/M) 686 1.0098 0.0655 0.5702 1.3626 
School dropout rate      
    Female (F) 687 0.0903 0.0718 0 0.3175 
    Male (M) 686 0.1041 0.0723 0.0090 0.3171 
    Relative (F/M) 686 0.8302 0.2270 0.1972 1.9668 
Never-enroll rate      
    Female (F) 687 0.0233 0.0496 0 0.4909 
    Male (M) 686 0.0183 0.0240 0 0.2430 
    Relative (F/M) 685 1.0026 0.6009 0 4.9914 
      
Panel B: 15-17 years old population 
School attendance rate      
   Female (F) 686 0.6593 0.1687 0.1643 0.9516 
   Male (M) 686 0.6100 0.1532 0.0909 0.9431 
   Relative (F/M) 686 1.0882 0.1754 0.3962 3.8824 
School dropout rate      
    Female (F) 686 0.3105 0.1410 0.0460 0.7452 
    Male (M) 686 0.3692 0.1399 0.0542 0.9091 
    Relative (F/M) 686 0.8315 0.1502 0.4054 1.4544 
Never-enroll rate      
    Female (F) 686 0.0301 0.0667 0 0.6025 
    Male (M) 686 0.0207 0.0278 0 0.3088 
    Relative (F/M) 684 1.1059 0.8043 0 7.1286 
      
Panel C: 1991-born population 
School attendance rate      
   Female (F) 686 0.5815 0.1881 0.1270 0.9299 
   Male (M) 686 0.5189 0.1714 0.1000 0.9220 
   Relative (F/M) 686 1.0660 0.1767 0.3016 2.1948 
NEEU taken rate      
   Female (F) 680 0.5182 0.1552 0 0.9498 
   Male (M) 682 0.3739 0.1379 0 0.9485 
   Relative (F/M) 677 1.4805 0.4403 0 6 
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Online Appendix 5 Descriptive statistics of 2009 NEEU test scores by gender and test 
classification 
 Female  Male  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
     
A classification 
    
Z-score     
   Sum –0.0647 0.9617 0.0719 1.0362 
   Physics –0.0261 0.9721 0.0293 1.0294 
   Mathematics –0.0836 0.9721 0.0926 1.0221 
   Chemistry –0.0605 0.9577 0.0673 1.0408 
No privilege 0.9063 0.2915 0.8926 0.3096 
N 178,796  162,059       
B classification 
    
Z–score     
   Sum –0.0936 0.9759 0.1098 1.0167 
   Biology –0.0791 1.0055 0.0921 0.9857 
   Mathematics –0.0880 0.9659 0.1033 1.0291 
   Chemistry –0.0675 0.9559 0.0794 1.0438 
No privilege 0.8988 0.3015 0.9069 0.2906 
N 96,083  82,621       
C classification 
    
Z-score     
   Sum 0.0296 1.0098 –0.1319 0.9431 
   Literature 0.0940 0.9891 –0.4141 0.9388 
   History –0.0118 1.0023 0.0489 0.9870 
   Geography 0.0039 1.0082 –0.0170 0.9617 
No privilege 0.8524 0.3547 0.8566 0.3505 
N 41,420  9,301       
D classification     
Z–score     
    Sum –0.0003 1.0036 0.0032 0.9848 
    Literature 0.1081 0.9796 –0.4539 0.9569 
    Mathematics –0.0477 0.9793 0.2030 1.0594 
    Foreign language –0.0266 0.9849 0.1134 1.0544 
No privilege 0.9424 0.2330 0.9546 0.2081 
N 89,741  21,288  
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Online Appendix 6 Correlations between number of elites and the instrumental variable 
 
Elite Number Number Number Number Density Density Density Density 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
The instrumental variable –0.0073*** –0.0591** –0.0074*** –0.0525** –0.0001*** –0.0030*** –0.0001*** –0.0021*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0255) (0.0007) (0.0230) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0006) 
Other controls No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Province FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.239 0.584 0.371 0.620 0.056 0.242 0.204 0.365 
 
Notes: 
Other controls included the Kinh ethnic rate, nighttime light intensity, population density in 2009, urban land ratio and cropland ratio in 1992, mean elevation 
in 1996, and distance to the coastline. Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). P-weight was in all estimations. N = 687. 
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Online Appendix 7 Correlations between density of present-day facilities and the instrumental variable  
 Education Health 
Variables Secondary school High school University Hospital Clinic Communal health station 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Without province FE        
Instrumental variable –0.0000*** –0.0000*** –0.0000** –0.0000*** –0.0000** –0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.617 0.178 0.368 0.137 0.047 0.615 
       
With province FE        
Instrumental variable –0.0000 0.0000 –0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.685 0.312 0.491 0.266 0.289 0.756 
       
 
Notes: 
N = 687 districts. All estimations included the Kinh ethnic rate, nighttime light intensity, population density in 2009, urban land ratio and cropland ratio in 
1992, mean elevation in 1996, and distance to the coastline. Outcomes were measured in density (per capita in 2009). Robust standard errors in parentheses 
(*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1). P-weight was in all estimations. 
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Online Appendix 8 Repeating estimations in Table 1 using elite density 
 
Age cohort 0-4 11-33   22+   
Variables Sex ratio Literate rate   Years of schooling 
 M/F Female Male F/M Female Male F/M 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
           
Elite density 0.0113 0.0043 0.0045 0.0001 0.8373* 0.7229* 0.0155** 
 (0.0074) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0009) (0.4480) (0.4074) (0.0071) 
R-squared 0.240 0.566 0.410 0.557 0.532 0.589 0.289 
        
IV 2nd stage (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
               
Elite density 0.1155*** 0.1084*** 0.1303*** –0.0246** 7.1748*** 8.1947*** –0.0778*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0258) (0.0286) (0.0103) (1.3841) (1.6326) (0.0282) 
F-statistics† 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 
        
 
Notes: 
Similar to Table 1. N = 687 districts 
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Online Appendix 9 Repeating estimations in Table 2 using elite density 
 
 School attendance rate School dropout rate Never-enroll rate 
 Female Male F/M Female Male F/M Female Male F/M 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
             
Elite density 0.0294* 0.0291 0.0002 –0.0270* –0.0271 –0.0373* –0.0024* –0.0021 0.0148 
 (0.0175) (0.0178) (0.0013) (0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0224) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0258) 
R-squared 0.233 0.165 0.301 0.153 0.144 0.196 0.428 0.286 0.428 
          
IV 2nd stage (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
                 
Elite density 0.5375*** 0.6347*** –0.1292*** –0.5027*** –0.5711*** –0.2435*** –0.0356*** –0.0645*** 0.6892*** 
 (0.1134) (0.1340) (0.0308) (0.1059) (0.1204) (0.0853) (0.0094) (0.0142) (0.1906) 
F-statistics† 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 
          
N districts 687 686 686 687 686 686 687 686 685 
 
Note: Similar to Table 1. 
 
 26 
Online Appendix 10 Repeating estimations in Table 3 using elite density 
 
 School attendance rate School dropout rate Never-enroll rate 
 Female Male F/M Female Male F/M Female Male F/M 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
             
Elite density 0.0656 0.0628 0.0029 –0.0624 –0.0601 0.0100 –0.0032* –0.0027 –0.02659 
 (0.0419) (0.0395) (0.0058) (0.0403) (0.0378) (0.0202) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0217) 
R-squared 0.233 0.246 0.272 0.181 0.232 0.264 0.438 0.258 0.420 
          
IV 2nd stage (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
                 
Elite density 1.0177*** 1.0988*** –0.2697*** –0.9710*** –1.0178*** –0.1802** –0.0474*** –0.0817*** 0.9571*** 
 (0.2116) (0.2288) (0.0710) (0.2019) (0.2116) (0.0770) (0.0126) (0.0180) (0.2606) 
F-statistics† 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.90 
          
N districts 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 684 
 
Note: Similar to Table 1. 
 
 27 
Online Appendix 11 Repeating estimations in Table 4 using elite density 
 
 School attendance rate NEEU test taking rate 
 Female Male F/M Female Male F/M 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Elite density 0.0813 0.0765 0.0006 0.0277*** 0.0219*** 0.0017 
 (0.0519) (0.0476) (0.0059) (0.0087) (0.0078) (0.0131) 
R-squared 0.233 0.264 0.092 0.389 0.487 0.340 
       
IV 2nd stage (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
Elite density 1.2082*** 1.2268*** –0.2828*** 0.2685*** –0.0201 0.8286*** 
 (0.2488) (0.2532) (0.0795) (0.0782) (0.0439) (0.2021) 
F-statistics† 23.90 23.90 23.90 23.79 23.84 23.79 
       
N districts 686 686 686 680 682 677 
 
Note: Similar to Table 1. 
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Online Appendix 12 Repeating estimations in Table 5 using elite density 
 
Classification A    B    
Variables Sum Physics Mathematics Chemistry Sum Biology Mathematics Chemistry 
Female sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Elite density 1.2107*** 1.4623*** 0.6556*** 1.0561*** 1.8797*** 0.0670 2.5268*** 1.4805*** 
 (0.3550) (0.4239) (0.2025) (0.3105) (0.3766) (0.1048) (0.4997) (0.3033) 
F–statistics† 12.23 12.23 12.23 12.23 26.79 26.79 26.79 26.79 
N test takers 178,796 178,796 178,796 178,796 96,083 96,083 96,083 96,083 
Male sample (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Elite density 0.8553*** 0.8748*** 0.5116*** 0.8779*** 1.7958*** –0.2493** 2.3224*** 1.7951*** 
 (0.2687) (0.2731) (0.1676) (0.2754) (0.4273) (0.0970) (0.5479) (0.4247) 
F–statistics† 10.55 10.55 10.55 10.55 18.72 18.72 18.72 18.72 
N test takers 162,059 162,059 162,059 162,059 82,621 82,621 82,621 82,621 
Classification C    D    
Variables Sum Literature History Geography Sum Literature Mathematics Foreign language 
Female sample (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Elite density 2.8123*** 4.7486*** 0.8923*** 1.6106*** 1.0279*** 1.5325*** 0.7247*** 0.1955** 
 (0.4477) (0.7047) (0.2518) (0.3206) (0.3601) (0.5345) (0.2573) (0.0818) 
F–statistics† 48.84 48.84 48.84 48.84 8.10 8.10 8.10 8.10 
N test takers 41,420 41,420 41,420 41,420 89,741 89,741 89,741 89,741 
Male sample (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
Elite density 0.3823* 2.4610*** –0.7489*** –0.3248 0.4747** 0.6305** 0.5152** –0.1057 
 (0.1985) (0.5813) (0.2696) (0.1983) (0.1843) (0.2485) (0.2067) (0.0651) 
F–statistics† 20.91 20.91 20.91 20.91 6.23 6.23 6.23 6.23 
N test takers 9,301 9,301 9,301 9,301 21,288 21,288 21,288 21,288 
Note: 
Similar to Table 5.
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Online Appendix 13 Effects on present-day relative ratio accounting for different maximum distance when constructing the IV 
 
Age 0-4 11-33 11-14   15-17   1991-born 22+ 
Variables Sex ratio Literate rate Attendance  Dropout 
Never-
enroll Attendance  Dropout 
Never-
enroll Attendance 
NEEU test 
taking 
Years of 
schooling 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
            
Max = 3000km 
Elite 
number 0.0018*** 
–
0.0004*** 
–
0.0021*** –0.0039*** 0.0110*** 
–
0.0043*** 
–
0.0029*** 0.0153*** 
–
0.0045*** 0.0133*** 
–
0.0012*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0003) 
Max = 4000km 
Elite 
number 0.0018*** 
–
0.0004*** 
–
0.0021*** 
–
0.0039*** 0.0110*** 
–
0.0043*** 
–
0.0029*** 0.0153*** 
–
0.0045*** 0.0133*** 
–
0.0012*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0011) (0.0022) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0003) 
            
N districts 687 687 686 686 685 686 686 684 686 677 687 
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Online Appendix 14 Effects on present-day relative ratio accounting for spatial correlations 
 
Age 0-4 11-33 11-14   15-17   1991-born 22+ 
Variables Sex ratio Literate rate Attendance  Dropout 
Never-
enroll Attendance  Dropout 
Never-
enroll Attendance 
NEEU test 
taking 
Years of 
schooling 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Cutoff = 25km 
Elite 
number 0.0018*** –0.0004** 
–
0.0021*** 
–
0.0039*** 0.0110*** 
–
0.0043*** –0.0029** 0.0153*** 
–
0.0045*** 0.0133*** –0.0012** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0031) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0043) (0.0013) (0.0032) (0.0006) 
            
Cutoff = 50km 
Elite 
number 0.0018*** –0.0004 
–
0.0021*** –0.0039** 0.0110*** –0.0043** –0.0029** 0.0153*** –0.0045** 0.0133*** –0.0012 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0042) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0056) (0.0019) (0.0042) (0.0008) 
            
Cutoff = 100km 
Elite 
number 0.0018*** –0.0004 
–
0.0021*** –0.0039* 0.0110** –0.0043** –0.0029** 0.0153** –0.0045* 0.0133*** –0.0012* 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0021) (0.0052) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0067) (0.0024) (0.0048) (0.0007) 
            
N districts 687 687 686 686 685 686 686 684 686 677 687 
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Online Appendix 15 The impact of Confucianism on child mortality using the IV approach 
and a 3 percent sample of the 1999 Population and Housing Census 
 
 (1) (2) 
Elite number –0.0002** –0.0004*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
F-statistics† 69.05 90.75 
Other controls No Yes 
 
Notes:  
Similar to Table 1. N = 535 districts. We used only consistent districts matched between 
administration divisions in 1999 and 2009.
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Table 1 The impact of Confucianism on sex ratio, literacy rate, and years of schooling 
 
Age cohort 0-4 11-33   22+   
 Sex ratio Literate rate   Years of schooling   
 M/F Female Male F/M Female Male F/M 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
           
Elite number 0.0011*** 0.0003*** 0.0005*** –0.0002*** 0.0306*** 0.0339*** –0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0002) 
R-squared 0.351 0.568 0.433 0.558 0.550 0.623 0.279 
        
IV 2nd stage (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
               
Elite number 0.0018*** 0.0017*** 0.0021*** –0.0004*** 0.1147*** 0.1310*** –0.0012*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0114) (0.0128) (0.0003) 
F-statistics† 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 
        
 
Notes: 
† Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for testing H0: Weak identification test.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1).  
P-weight was in all estimations.  
Other controls were the Kinh ethnic rate, nighttime light intensity, population density in 2009, urban land ratio and cropland ratio in 1992, mean elevation in 
1996, and distance to the coastline in every estimation.  
N = 687. 
 
 33 
Table 2 The impact of Confucianism on pursuing education among the 11–14 age cohort  
 
 School attendance rate School dropout rate Never-enroll rate 
 Female Male F/M Female Male F/M Female Male F/M 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
             
Elite number 0.0024*** 0.0026*** –0.0003*** –0.0023*** –0.0024*** –0.0028*** –0.0001*** –0.0002*** 0.0019* 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0011) 
R-squared 0.320 0.289 0.308 0.278 0.285 0.220 0.430 0.304 0.431 
          
IV 2nd stage (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
                 
Elite number 0.0086*** 0.0101*** –0.0021*** –0.0080*** –0.0091*** –0.0039*** –0.0006*** –0.0010*** 0.0110*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0022) 
F-statistics† 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 
          
N districts 687 686 686 687 686 686 687 686 685 
 
Note: Similar to Table 1. 
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Table 3 The impact of Confucianism on pursuing education among the 15–17 age cohort  
 
 School attendance rate School dropout rate Never-enroll rate 
 Female Male F/M Female Male F/M Female Male F/M 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
             
Elite number 0.0049*** 0.0048*** –0.0005 –0.0048*** –0.0046*** –0.0024*** –0.0002*** –0.0003*** 0.0024* 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0013) 
R-squared 0.342 0.362 0.275 0.309 0.351 0.296 0.439 0.281 0.422 
          
IV 2nd stage (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
                 
Elite number 0.0163*** 0.0176*** –0.0043*** –0.0155*** –0.0163*** –0.0029*** –0.0008*** –0.0013*** 0.0153*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0029) 
F-statistics† 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 119.19 
          
N districts 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 686 684 
 
Note: Similar to Table 1. 
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Table 4 The impact of Confucianism on school attendance and NEEU test-taking rate among those born in 1991 
 
 School attendance rate NEEU test taking rate 
 Female Male F/M Female Male F/M 
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
         
Elite number 0.0058*** 0.0054*** –0.0005 0.0007 –0.0005 0.0031*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
R-squared 0.350 0.375 0.094 0.387 0.484 0.354 
       
IV 2nd stage (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
Elite number 0.0193*** 0.0196*** –0.0045*** 0.0043*** –0.0003 0.0133*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0019) 
F-statistics† 119.19 119.19 119.19 118.82 118.89 118.85 
       
N districts 686 686 686 680 682 677 
 
Note: Similar to Table 1. 
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Table 5 The impact of Confucianism on 2009 NEEU z-scores by gender using the IV approach 
 
Classification A    B    
Variables Sum Physics Mathematics Chemistry Sum Biology Mathematics Chemistry 
Female sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Elite number 0.0241*** 0.0291*** 0.0130*** 0.0210*** 0.0224*** 0.0008 0.0301*** 0.0176*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0030) (0.0020) 
F–statistics† 134.09 134.09 134.09 134.09 127.24 127.24 127.24 127.24 
N test takers 178,796 178,796 178,796 178,796 96,083 96,083 96,083 96,083 
Male sample (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Elite number 0.0190*** 0.0194*** 0.0114*** 0.0195*** 0.0256*** –0.0036*** 0.0332*** 0.0256*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0031) (0.0025) 
F–statistics† 134.08 134.08 134.08 134.08 135.27 135.27 135.27 135.27 
N test takers 162,059 162,059 162,059 162,059 82,621 82,621 82,621 82,621 
Classification C    D    
Variables Sum Literature History Geography Sum Literature Mathematics Foreign language 
Female sample (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Elite number 0.0260*** 0.0439*** 0.0083*** 0.0149*** 0.0319*** 0.0476*** 0.0225*** 0.0061*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0043) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0027) (0.0017) 
F–statistics† 123.44 123.44 123.44 123.44 115.41 115.41 115.41 115.41 
N test takers 41,420 41,420 41,420 41,420 89,741 89,741 89,741 89,741 
Male sample (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) 
Elite number 0.0049** 0.0313*** –0.0095*** –0.0041* 0.0243*** 0.0322*** 0.0263*** –0.0054** 
 (0.0023) (0.0035) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0044) (0.0035) (0.0022) 
F-statistics† 146.11 146.11 146.11 146.11 79.16 79.16 79.16 79.16 
N test takers 9,301 9,301 9,301 9,301 21,288 21,288 21,288 21,288 
Notes: 
† Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic for testing H0: Weak identification test. Robust district clustered standard errors in parentheses (*** p < 0.01, ** p < 
0.05, * p < 0.1). Other controls were !"	$%&'&()*), the Kinh ethnic ratio, 2009 nighttime light intensity, 2009 population density, 1992 urban land ratio and 
1992 cropland ratio, 1996 mean elevation, and distance to the coastline in every estimation. 
